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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Discounting  future  costs  and  health  beneﬁts  usually  has  a large  effect  on results  of  cost-effectiveness
evaluations of  vaccination  because  of  delays  between  the  initial  expenditure  in the  programme  and  the
health beneﬁts  from  averting  disease.  Most  guidelines  currently  recommend  discounting  both  costs  and
health effects  at  a positive,  constant,  common  rate  back  to a common  point  in  time.  A review  of  84  pub-
lished  economic  evaluations  of  vaccines  found  that  most  of  them  apply  these  recommendations.  However,
both technical  and  normative  arguments  have  been  presented  for discounting  health  at  a different  rate
to consumption  (differential  discounting),  discounting  at a  rate  that  changes  over time  (non-constant
discounting),  discounting  intra-generational  and  inter-generational  effects  at a different  rate  (two-stage
discounting),  and  discounting  the health  gains  from  an  intervention  to a different  discount  year  from
the  time  of  intervention  (delayed  discounting).  These  considerations  are  particularly  acute  for  vaccines,
because  their  effects  can  occur  in  a different  generation  from  the  one  paying  for  them,  and  because
the  time  of  vaccination,  of infection  aversion,  and  of  disease  aversion  usually  differ.  Using  differential,
two-stage  or delayed  discounting  in model-based  cost-effectiveness  evaluations  of vaccination  raises
technical  challenges,  but  mechanisms  have  been  proposed  to overcome  them.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND. Introduction
Economic considerations increasingly drive public investments
n vaccines [1]. A key decision-making tool is economic evaluation,
hich weighs the incremental cost of vaccination against the incre-
ental health and economic beneﬁts that it brings. Since vaccines
revent future disease from occurring, the costs and beneﬁts asso-
iated with vaccination usually fall at different times. Economists
egard present consumption (see Table 1 for deﬁnitions of terms in
talics) as more valuable than future consumption, because (i) there
s an opportunity cost to consuming now rather than later, since the
oney spent could have been invested elsewhere to generate someeturns, and (ii) most people simply prefer to consume now rather
han later, all other things being equal [2]. The standard approach
o collectively capture these preferences for present over future
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consumption is by discounting, which reduces the value of future
costs and beneﬁts compared to those in the present [3].
The most common method is to apply a constant (exponential)
discounting rate, and to use the same rate for consumption and
health. Constant rate discounting is supported by the discounted
utility model, which states that the utility derived from consump-
tion at a future time t is the same as the utility now multiplied
by a discounting factor (1 + r)−t. However, this standard model of
discounting has been challenged [4–10], particularly for the case
of vaccines [11–16], since they have distinct characteristics not
shared by many other health interventions and hence their cost-
effectiveness can be particularly sensitive to discounting. In light of
the importance of discounting to economic evaluations of vaccines,
this paper aims to survey the methodological basis and merits of
alternatives to standard discounting schemes, as well as to consider
how they may  apply to vaccination. We ﬁrst review how discount-
ing is used in current economic evaluations of vaccination, then
list the main features of vaccination that distinguish it from other
health interventions. We  explore how alternatives to the standard
discounting model may  address these features with respect to four
key areas: differential discounting (discounting health at a differ-
ent rate to consumption), societal preferences, inter-generational
effects and the timing of health gains. Finally, we propose solutions
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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Table  1
Glossary of key economic terms used.
Consumption The ﬁnal purchase for use of goods or services by
individuals (consumers).
Cost–beneﬁt
analysis
A type of economic evaluation in which the
incremental costs and beneﬁts of an intervention are
both expressed in monetary units.
Cost-effectiveness
analysis
A type of economic evaluation in which the
incremental costs of an intervention are compared to
the incremental outcomes of the intervention
expressed in physical units such as cases of disease
averted, lives saved or quality adjusted life years
gained.
Discounting Reduction in the value of a future cost or beneﬁt at a
pre-speciﬁed rate, which depends on its temporal
distance from a common time (such as the time at
which an intervention like a vaccination programme is
initiated).
Externality Cost or beneﬁt that does not fall on the person
producing or consuming a good.
Opportunity cost The value of the next best alternative use of resources
which is foregone when the resources are consumed.
Social rate of time
preference
The rate at which society values present over future
consumption.
Standard gamble Method of eliciting the value that individuals place on
a health state by asking them their preference between
being in a health state, and being in perfect health but
with some given risk of instant death.
Stated preference Method of eliciting individuals’ preferences for
different options by asking them what they would do
in hypothetical situations.
Stationarity Preference between two  outcomes that depends only
on  the time interval between them and not on when
the ﬁrst event occurs.
Time tradeoff Method of eliciting the value that individuals place on
a health state by asking them their preference between
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ma  shorter time spent in perfect health, and a longer
time spent in that health state.
o some of the technical issues that may  arise with alternative dis-
ounting schemes.
. Review of discounting in economic evaluations of
accination
.1. Methods
We  examined how discounting is used in economic evalua-
ions of vaccination reviewed in six recent systematic reviews of
conomic evaluations of vaccines against human papillomavirus
17] (n = 12); Streptococcus pneumoniae [18] (n = 15), [19] (n = 10);
otavirus [20] (n = 17); Haemophilus inﬂuenzae type B [21] (n = 13);
nd seasonal inﬂuenza [22] (n = 18).
. Results
In total 84 unique economic evaluations of vaccines published
rom 1993 to 2014 were examined (see appendix for details).
Of these, 19 (23%) did not discount at all. These included 14
valuations of paediatric inﬂuenza vaccination and two of pneu-
ococcal conjugate vaccination [23,24], where the time horizon
ver which costs and effects are assessed was less than a year.
he time horizons of less than 1 year and the lack of discounting
ere not inappropriate in most cases, as there were no long-term
onsequences to consider in the analysis. However, some of these
valuations included considerations of years of life saved beyond
he time horizon, which would normally be discounted. One evalu-
tion of rotavirus vaccination had a time horizon of 5 years, which
he authors considered short enough to ignore discounting effects
25]. Two others (on Haemophilus inﬂuenzae type B [26] and pneu-
ococcal conjugate vaccination [27]) had longer time horizons but3 (2015) 3788–3794 3789
gave no justiﬁcation for failing to discount. A further four (5%) dis-
counted beneﬁts alone (and not costs), while 11 (13%) discounted
costs alone (and not beneﬁts).
Of the remaining 50 studies discounting both costs and effects,
43 (51%) used the standard discounting scheme of discount rates
that are constant over time and equal for both costs and effects
(with rates ranging from 3 to 6%). However, one (1%) used stepwise
equal rates (reﬂecting United Kingdom Treasury recommendations
[28], see section on “non-constant discounting” for details) and six
(7%) used constant rates but discounted costs at a higher rate than
beneﬁts. Of the studies with differential discounting, ﬁve of them
reﬂected national guidelines (as the United Kingdom prior to 2004,
the Netherlands and Belgium recommended differential discount-
ing). However, one (set in France) did not, instead justifying the
choice by appealing to the controversy over whether economic
evaluations of vaccination should use equal discounting [29].
Of the 84 studies, 52 (62%) involved tracking a single age cohort.
A further 16 (19%) tracked a range of age groups, but either only
followed outcomes for a year or less, or did not consider the tim-
ing of outcomes at all. Of the remaining 16 (19%) studies that
tracked multiple cohorts over several years, eight were static or
pseudo-dynamic models with no interactions between effects in
different cohorts. The remaining eight were dynamic models with
inter-cohort effects.
4. Distinctive intertemporal features of vaccination
Vaccination has several distinctive intertemporal features com-
pared to most other health interventions. First, there are often long
delays between vaccine administration (when costs are incurred)
and disease averted (when beneﬁts are obtained), so beneﬁts are
greatly affected by discounting. For example, vaccination against
human papillomavirus [15] or hepatitis B [14] involves decades-
long delays between initial costs and eventual beneﬁts. In contrast,
interventions without long-lasting effects (such as pain relief that
provides immediate but short-term relief of symptoms) may  be
largely insensitive to discounting.
Second, vaccines have positive externalities: they not only
reduce disease risk in vaccinees but also provide “herd” or
community-level protection to others who  might otherwise have
been infected by vaccinated individuals. The externalities are non-
linear with respect to coverage: if a single individual is vaccinated,
the health gain to others is small, but if most susceptible individ-
uals are vaccinated, there is a substantial health gain to others. Herd
protection from vaccination can persist for years, and indeed indef-
initely in the case of eradication. Hence there can be delays between
the earlier cost of vaccination and realisation of herd protection
effects. Capturing these effects often requires multiple cohort mod-
els that stretch further into the future compared to models of
non-infectious diseases.
The interaction between time differences and generational dif-
ferences can be complex. They are illustrated in Table 2 for four
vaccines:
• Considerable expense was spent on smallpox eradication until it
was achieved in 1979. Today, expenditure on smallpox vaccina-
tion is virtually zero, but we  continue to receive beneﬁts from
having eradicated smallpox (which was estimated to cost the
world $1.35 billion a year in 1967 [30]). Note that even in the
1970s there were generational differences in beneﬁts of vaccina-
tion: children were protected from disease, while their parents
were already immune due to prior vaccination or infection.
• Human papillomavirus vaccination protects current adolescents
from future cervical cancer. It has a smaller effect on current
adults because the vaccine is only prophylactic, and many of them
3790 M. Jit, W.  Mibei / Vaccine 3
Table 2
Temporal and generational timing of beneﬁts from four vaccines.
Vaccine Beneﬁts
Present generation
(present adults)
Future generations
(present children)
Smallpox
Present (1970) Very small Large
Future Very small Very large
Human papillomavirus
Present (2010) Small Small
Future Small Large
Varicella
Present (2010) Very small Medium
Future Possibly negative Large
Paediatric inﬂuenza
•
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Future Very small Very small
have already been infected with human papillomavirus. Hence,
there are fewer inter-cohort effects, but time delays between
costs (vaccination) and beneﬁts (preventing cervical cancer) are
important.
Varicella vaccination protects current children from varicella, and
years later, protects them from zoster, a more severe disease
caused by reactivation of varicella in people who have recov-
ered. In current adults though, vaccination could actually result
in higher zoster incidence [31]. Hence, there are important inter-
cohort effects, with beneﬁts to cohorts receiving the vaccine but
detriments to older cohorts.
Paediatric inﬂuenza vaccination directly protects children from
inﬂuenza, and indirectly protects adults through herd immunity.
In developed countries, children are the main inﬂuenza trans-
mitters, but older adults are the most susceptible to inﬂuenza
complications [32]. However, the present year’s inﬂuenza vac-
cine offers few beneﬁts to either children or adults in future years,
since the inﬂuenza virus will no longer genetically match the vac-
cine in the future. Hence, there are important inter-cohort effects,
but time differences are less important.
These inter-cohort effects change the nature of the decision
roblem. Non-infectious diseases are usually modelled with a sin-
le age cohort only, because intervening in that age-cohort is not
xpected to bring important health effects to other age-cohorts.
ence, a decision made for the present cohort would be equally
alid to future cohorts unless conditions change. Equally, if it was
eversed in the future it would simply return future cohorts to the
tatus quo prior to the decision. In contrast, decisions about vac-
ines affect multiple cohorts over several years. Hence, economic
valuations of vaccination are often based around transmission
ynamic models which consist of several interacting age-cohorts in
rder to capture the inter-generational externalities of vaccination
1].
. Discounting health
Future costs are often discounted at the social rate of time pref-
rence, which has three components [2,28,33,34]: (i) pure time
reference or “myopia”, an individual preference for consumption
ow instead of later due to impatience, (ii) time preference due
o uncertainty about the ability to consume in the future, and (iii)
ecreasing marginal utility of consumption, as economic growth
auses future consumption to exceed present consumption. These
ffects relate to time preferences of individuals, but can arguably be
xtended to justify discounting societal investments [28,35]. From
his perspective, the discount rate has been expressed as the rate3 (2015) 3788–3794
at which society is willing to tradeoff consumption today for con-
sumption in the future. This can arguably be captured, for example,
by the long-term interest rate on government bonds which meas-
ures the market rate at which the government is able to make this
tradeoff.
Health economic evaluations involve estimates of health effects
as well as costs (consumption). Most health economic guidelines,
including the Washington Panel on Cost-effectiveness in Health and
Medicine [36] and the World Health Organization (WHO) [35], rec-
ommend discounting both costs and health effects at an equal rate.
Only three countries (Poland, the Netherlands, and Belgium) rec-
ommend differential discounting in their base case [37]. WHO  also
recommend sensitivity analyses including discounting health at a
lower rate than consumption [35] and using a nonconstant dis-
count rate when evaluating effects over long time-scales [38]. The
UK National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) ini-
tially recommended discounting health at a lower rate than costs,
but switched to equal discounting in 2004 in a move that prompted
robust debate [4,39].
NICE have issued special discounting guidance for cases in which
“treatment restores people who  would otherwise die or have a
very severely impaired life to full or near full health, and when this
is sustained over a very long period (normally at least 30 years)”
[40], initially recommending differential discounting and subse-
quently amending the guidance to an equal rate lower than the
standard reference case rate. Paulden and O’Mahony have criticised
these conditions (in their original application to differential dis-
counting) as inconsistent and discriminatory, because they appear
to exclude interventions that are preventive or which need to be
maintained over time. Hence, there are disease conditions where
different interventions that decrease their impact (such as preven-
tive and curative ones) would be evaluated with different discount
rates [41].
As previously discussed, discounting future health has a pro-
nounced effect on vaccination because of the long delay between
costs and beneﬁts. Bonneaux has argued that this disparity may
reﬂect the “law of cure” [42] or “rule of rescue” that, in McKie
and Richardson’s formulation [43], leads people to prioritise sav-
ing lives of identiﬁable individuals facing imminent death over
“statistical lives” that can be saved through preventive measures
like vaccination. McKie and Richardson suggest that “identiﬁabil-
ity” may  be defensible on utilitarian grounds because it supports
“people’s belief that they live in a community that places great
value upon life”, but is still a morally dubious criterion for discrim-
ination. NICE has explicitly excluded using the rule of rescue as a
decision-making criterion [44].
6. Equal vs. differential discounting
Equal discounting of costs and health effects is supported by
several arguments. One is Weinstein and Stason’s consistency the-
sis [45]: equal discounting ensures that two  programmes initiated
at separate times but with identical cost and health consequences
(when measured over the same period of time following initiation)
receive equal priority when the value of health is constant over
time. Williams [46] elucidates the reasoning behind equal prioriti-
sation: on a societal level, marginal investment in consumption can
be substituted with marginal investment in health. Hence, a steady
state relationship should exist between consumption and health,
i.e. the (consumption) value of health should remain constant over
time.A second argument is Keeler and Cretin’s postponement para-
dox [47]. They argue that if health is discounted at a lower rate
than costs, then the cost-effectiveness of a health investment will
improve further in the future if it is postponed, resulting in health
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nvestments being “paralysed” into inﬁnite postponement. This
rgument has been criticised as being usually irrelevant since deci-
ion makers are typically choosing between competing priorities
o fund from a ﬁxed annual budget, rather than the optimal tim-
ng of a given investment. Hence, the issue of cohorts of patients
n different years competing for the same resources never arises
7,10,48,49].
The last argument is made by Lipscomb et al. [36] from the per-
pective of horizontal equity. Equal discounting preserves “time
eutrality” by giving equal treatment to potential beneﬁciaries who
re alike in every respect except for their position in time relative to
he decision time. The counter-argument is that these beneﬁciaries
re not actually equal because they live in societies with different
ncome levels, available health technologies and hence valuations
f health [5].
These arguments assume that the value of health is constant
ver time. If the relative value of health increases as society
ecomes wealthier, then Gravelle and Smith showed that the dis-
ount rate for health should be approximately the discount rate for
osts less the growth rate in the value of health [7]. More recently,
laxton et al. [9] developed Gravelle and Smith’s framework further
y suggesting that the validity of differential discounting depends
n whether the decision maker is seeking to maximise welfare
r health itself, whether the budget for health care is ﬁxed and
hether the value of health changes over time. They show that
he differential between the discount rate for costs and health can
e informed by growth in either the value of health, or the cost-
ffectiveness threshold.
. Individual vs. societal preferences
Individuals have time preferences that can be elicited using dif-
erent methods, including empirical stated preference studies. The
ocial rate of time preference relates to preferences of society as a
hole for present over future consumption. The appropriate way  to
stablish this rate, and in particular how it relates to the time pref-
rence of individuals, is not straightforward [2,6]. One approach
s simply to treat it as the average of individual time preferences.
owever, stated preference studies often [50] (but not always [51])
nd that individual discount rates exceed societal rates. Hence,
lson suggests that such studies, if they are to be used at all, should
sk individuals to prioritise based on their preferences about the
emporal distribution of health in society, without foreknowledge
bout what their position in that society is [52]. Nevertheless, some
conomists believe that social decision making should reﬂect the
ggregation of individual rather than social preferences to avoid
verriding the choices that people make in their individual deci-
ions (the principle of consumer sovereignty).
One component of the social discount rate is uncertainty about
he possibility of being able to enjoy the beneﬁts of future con-
umption. This uncertainty stems from several kinds of risk: (i)
atastrophe risk, the risk that society itself will no longer exist in
 form that will allow these beneﬁts to be enjoyed [28]; (ii) unan-
icipated risks which may  lead to future beneﬁts of a particular
rogramme not materialising, such as obsolescence due to techno-
ogical innovation [28]; (iii) the risk that individuals will not enjoy
he future beneﬁts because of death or another personal catastro-
he [5]. The rest of this section discusses some of the challenges in
stimating these risks.
Of these risks, catastrophe risk is clearly relevant to society, but
ikely to be smaller than the risks operating on an individual level.
urray and Acharya suggest it may  not exceed 0.1% a year [53].
rogramme-speciﬁc risks are also relevant to society, but it would
eem difﬁcult to estimate them by asking individuals to quantify
he actual risk (rather than their subjective perception of that risk).3 (2015) 3788–3794 3791
Tinghög suggests that individual preferences should be overridden
in a case of “myopic preference failure”, where individuals are cog-
nitively unable to process the information necessary for welfare
maximisation, even if the information is technically available [6].
Parﬁt [54] suggests that if the reason for discounting is uncertainty
about the future, then the discount rate should be varied based on
the risk involved with the particular programme. Lipscomb et al.
[36] argue that programme-level uncertainty has no place in the
discount rate at all, but instead should be incorporated into the
expected outcomes of the cost-effectiveness analysis.
The third risk is that of individual risk of death or catastrophe.
Brouwer et al. [5] suggest that this risk is irrational at a societal
level, because some (usually predictable) proportion of individuals
will always live to receive health beneﬁts. Indeed, this risk may
be particularly irrelevant for vaccination programmes due to their
positive externalities. As Tasset et al. [11] point out, individuals may
discount future health beneﬁts because they fear not being able
to enjoy them, but the time period in which they were protected
from infection still contributes to societal (herd) protection, and
future generations can continue to enjoy this beneﬁt regardless of
whether individuals in the previous generation survive.
8. Intra- vs. inter-generational tradeoffs
As previously mentioned, the long-term effects of vaccines
can raise issues around the distinction between intra- and inter-
generational time tradeoff. This distinction has been made more
widely. In Gravelle and Smith’s terminology [7], a distinction should
be made between comparison of health effects of an individual
of age a at time t with the same individual of age a + 1 at time
t + 1 (intra-generational discounting), and of an individual of age
a at time t with another individual of age a at time t + 1 (inter-
generational discounting). Discounting will reduce the value of not
only any future health and consumption gains of the current gen-
eration, but also the total value of all the health and consumption
of a future cohort compared to the present one.
This distinction is particularly important for vaccines. Most
economic evaluations of interventions against non-infectious dis-
eases need only account for the cohort receiving the intervention,
whereas economic evaluations of vaccination often extend the
analysis to include future cohorts in order to better capture indi-
rect beneﬁts (and detriments) such as herd protection. The health
gains of future cohorts through herd protection are contingent on
decisions taken in earlier cohorts. In contrast, for evaluations of
treatment, health gains in future cohorts are independent of deci-
sions made in earlier cohorts.
Intra-generational discounting might legitimately be based on
individual time preferences, while inter-generational discounting
involves wider issues of fairness. Future generations cannot par-
ticipate in present decisions that will affect them. Schelling argues
that pure time preference measures “emphatic distance”, our pref-
erence for people closer to us in time as they are more familiar and
likely to be more similar to us [55]. However, Tinghög argues that it
would be unfair to disadvantage them purely because “it will ben-
eﬁt “us” instead of them” [6]. Sen [56] takes this further (albeit in
the context of energy policy) and argues that future generations
have rights to resources that we should not take away, even if their
utility loss is compensated by our gains.
To incorporate this distinction, Lipscomb [8] proposes “two-
stage discounting” in which health effects in the same individual
are discounted back to a common age using an estimate of individ-
ual time preference, then the individually discounted health effects
across all individuals are discounted back to a common time using
the social rate of time preference (which is lower than the private
rate of time preference).
3 cine 3
9
i
e
t
e
o
[
t
(
T
s
[
l
t
d
i
A
t
(
i
u
s
i
a
i
c
s
d
t
t
t
r
y
p
1
i
[
(
t
r
(
t
r
a
w
d
e
c
t
h
p
a
a
h
w
t
a792 M. Jit, W.  Mibei / Vac
. Non-constant discounting
Another approach is “slow” or non-constant discounting [57]
n which the discount rate decreases over time, so that it has less
ffect on distant beneﬁts, which accrue mainly to future genera-
ions. This is motivated from inter-generational concerns [53] and
mpirical studies showing that individuals have declining rates
f time preference as outcomes become more distant in time
51,58–61]. The resulting calculations are analytically simpler than
wo-stage discounting, albeit at the cost of being a more indirect
and less accurate) way of addressing inter-generational equity.
ime-dependent functions proposed for the discount rate include
tepwise, proportional [57], hyperbolic [58], and quasi-hyperbolic
62].
The UK Treasury recommends stepwise discounting to all pub-
ic sector bodies [28], but at a very slowly declining rate (3.5% for
he ﬁrst 30 years, declining to 3.0% from year 31 and with further
eclines from year 76); this will only make a perceptible difference
n analyses with effects that span several generations. Murray and
charya propose an exponentially declining rate in the short term
o reﬂect concern for proximal generations, and then a constant
but extremely low) rate thereafter [53]. Westra et al. [15] exam-
ned the cost-effectiveness of human papillomavirus vaccination
sing different several different discounting models.
One objection to “slow discounting” is that it would violate the
tationarity property [63]. Stationarity ensures preference stabil-
ty i.e. someone’s time preference for an event will not change
s time advances. However, stationarity is not always observed
n stated preference studies [64,65], and may  anyway be practi-
ally irrelevant if decisions are binding for the future. Harvey [57]
uggests that individuals can have “multiple selves” in behavioural
ecision theory (i.e. consider versions of themselves at different
ime points to be separate entities) and hence, experience different
ime preferences. However, even though individuals may  change
heir mind as an event draws near, the practical consequences of
eﬂecting this in decision rules have yet to be clariﬁed, and it has
et to be considered appropriate for policy makers to adopt such a
osition.
0. Timing of risk reduction vs. utility reduction
Vaccination involves three events separated in time: risk of
nfection, risk of mortality, and change in life expectancy. Bos et al.
14] has argued that health improvements following vaccination
and other preventive interventions) should be discounted from
he time of infection risk reduction to the time of the intervention,
ather than from when actual life years or health utilities are gained
i.e. when disease manifestations are prevented). The rationale is
hat vaccination is a good consumed for the sake of averting future
isk exposure, and the stream of life years saved as a result is simply
 statistical construct. Hence, health beneﬁts should be discounted
hen the good (vaccination) is used. However, these recommen-
ations have yet to be adopted in guidelines or used in economic
valuations.
Going a step further, Lowenstein and Prelec [66] developed the
oncepts of “savouring and dread”, anticipated pleasure or pain,
o explain why people often prefer to delay pleasant outcomes and
asten unpleasant ones. Cohen [67] uses these ideas to suggest that
art of the beneﬁt of preventive interventions includes not only
verting future disease, but also gaining “utility in anticipation”, or
nxiety reduction due to decreased risk of a future event. Since few
ealth risks are certain to occur and individuals are rarely aware of
hat would have occurred if a preventive measure had not been
aken, he argues that the primary motivation for taking preventive
ctions is to reduce the anxiety associated with a risk, rather than3 (2015) 3788–3794
to avert the risk itself. Drummond et al. [16] suggest that at least
part of the utility gain from vaccination should take place from the
time of vaccination rather than the time of disease averted.
The possibility of losing utility from dread may  imply negative
pure time preference for health, because averting future health
detriments may  be valued more highly the further away from the
present they are (because they are accompanied by a longer period
of dread). Indeed, stated preference studies have found that some
people do have zero or negative time preference [68], particularly
for health states perceived as more severe. Others report high pos-
itive time preference, sometimes even higher for health than for
consumption [50,51], but this may  reﬂect “status quo bias” [69]
since a person’s stock of health declines over time [7]. Furthermore,
even if a person’s pure time preference is negative, the overall pref-
erence may  be positive as a result of the uncertainty component.
11. Addressing technical difﬁculties
Because economic evaluations of vaccination often involve
models with multiple interacting cohorts, a number of techni-
cal difﬁculties arise when using differential, two-stage or delayed
discounting. O’Mahony et al. [70] demonstrated that the cost-
effectiveness of introducing vaccination improves as the number of
age-cohorts modelled increases under differential discounting, but
not under equal discounting. The issue arises because each succes-
sive age-cohort receives vaccination 1 year later and so is not “start
time neutral”, so cost-effectiveness improves with each successive
cohort, all else equal. Hence, vaccination will be less cost-effective
in a given cohort compared to previous cohorts when discounted
back to the same year.
Furthermore, zero or negative time preference for health would
result in inﬁnite beneﬁts at ﬁnite costs for disease eradication [53],
hence, justifying virtually unlimited reprioritizing of investments
towards eradication. Indeed, zero or negative time preference
would have the same effect for any successful vaccination pro-
gramme, unless the time horizon was  ﬁnite, since the discounted
costs and health effects from an inﬁnite number of cohorts need
to be summed up. Setting a ﬁnite time horizon is an unsatisfac-
tory solution as it is equivalent to having a 100% discount rate
after a certain time; there does not seem to be any empirical or
methodological justiﬁcation for this. When time preference for
both consumption and health is positive, an inﬁnite time hori-
zon does not pose methodological difﬁculties since the marginal
change in discounted costs and health effects with each additional
cohort rapidly diminishes. This problem is a special case of Parﬁt’s
“argument from excessive sacriﬁce” [54], in which the lack of posi-
tive time preference for beneﬁts may  cause the present generation
to sacriﬁce all its consumption for the sake of future generations.
Parﬁt’s solution is not to impose a positive time preference, but
to incorporate an equity criterion by which beneﬁts are equitably
shared between generations, so that no generation is asked to make
too great a sacriﬁce for the sake of another. For instance, a bound-
ary condition could be introduced such that the health of any given
generation would not be allowed to fall below a certain threshold
as a result of health resource allocation decisions.
Both these problems (cost-effectiveness depending on the num-
ber of cohorts modelled, and inﬁnite beneﬁts for ﬁnite costs) can be
avoided by using a modiﬁcation of Lipscomb’s two-stage discount-
ing [8]: discount costs and health effects in each cohort back to the
common age of vaccination using a differential rate, and then dis-
count them for each cohort back to a common time using the same
(possibly negative) societal discount rate. A difﬁculty arises because
with vaccination, health effects can fall on different cohorts from
those receiving the intervention, so they can be attributed either to
the cohort receiving the vaccine, or the cohort beneﬁtting from the
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ffects. The latter is both technically simpler (avoiding the need to
etermine which cohort beneﬁts from which vaccine) and easier
o justify, since beneﬁts are then discounted at the rate received
y the cohort in which they fall. A disadvantage of two-stage dis-
ounting is the added complexity of the procedure, especially in
ulti-cohort models. In environmental and energy policy, sim-
le formulations to achieve the same effect have been proposed.
or instance, Schelling [55] suggests that the pure time preference
lement of discounting is removed when considering intergener-
tional issues. However, equivalent formulae in health economics
re not obvious because improving the health of the present gen-
ration does not reduce the stock of health for future generations
n the way that may  happen with natural resources [53].
O’Mahony et al. suggest a more convenient solution that can
e applied to health: adjust the cost-effectiveness threshold in
ulti-cohort models based on the (discounted) incremental cost-
ffectiveness ratio of a hypothetical comparator which is just at this
hreshold when undiscounted [71]. They also show that the result-
ng solution is equivalent to the two-stage discounting scheme
escribed above.
2. Conclusion
Most economic evaluations of vaccination still discount both
osts and health at a positive, constant, common rate back to a
ommon time. Obviously, any adjustment in the way vaccine eval-
ations are discounted needs to be consistent with guidelines for
ealth economic evaluations in general, while being cognisant of
articular consequences for vaccines due to their distinctive fea-
ures. Differential discounting appears to be technically sound,
ore equitable from an inter-generational perspective than equal
iscounting, and is already accepted in some countries as appropri-
te to all health economic evaluations. Other adjustments, such as a
ecreasing rate of discounting or altering the time at which health
s discounted, may  also reﬂect our concern for inter-generational
quity and avoiding anxiety due to a potential future health detri-
ent. Hence, there are sound empirical, theoretical and ethical
ustiﬁcations for considering other departures from standard dis-
ounting, although the technical implications of these adjustments
re less well explored compared to those for differential discount-
ng. Since economic evaluations of vaccination are particularly
ensitive to discounting, future work to explore such alternatives
hould consider vaccination-speciﬁc issues as part of that enquiry.
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